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Abstract
This article critically examines the EU ETS intertemporal market
during its Phase I (2005-2007). We test the Hotelling rule as a key ele-
ment of a competitive equilibrium to validate whether allowance prices
rise at the same rate as the interest rate. Including readily observable
characteristics of the EU ETS such as the presence of one endogenous
structural break and the influence of other energy markets shocks, we
argue the inter-period ban on banking undermines the ability of the
EU ETS to provide efficient price signalling. We also find a signifi-
cant relationship between allowance price changes and the expected
scarcity of allowances approximated by the Ellerman-Parsons ratio.
Finally, our results show evidence of institutional learning by market
participants.
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1 Introduction
This article aims at characterizing the dynamic efficiency of the intertemporal
market on the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) during
the first period 2005-2007. A fundamental statement on emissions trading is
that allowances trading is efficient over time only if banking and borrowing
are authorized under certainty (Rubin (1996)) and under uncertainty (Schen-
nach (2000)). With such provisions, market prices will reflect opportunity
costs which will lead to an efficient choice of abatement measures (Schle-
ich et al. (2006)). Each year, when abatement together with endowment of
emission allowances are above emissions levels, regulated agents may bank
surplus allowances for potential later use. Conversely, if regulated agents do
not abate enough to cover their emissions level with their actual endowment,
they may borrow allowances from future allocations. By allowing agents to
arbitrate between actual and expected abatement costs over specific periods,
banking and borrowing allowances form a complementary dimension of flex-
ibility where agents can trade allowances not only spatially but also through
time. The most prominent example of the key role of such provisions is
the success1 of the US Acid Rain Program where banking has been a major
feature of this emissions trading (Ellerman et al. (2000)).
Prices develop differently in the following two cases. If inter-period bank-
ing is allowed, it is reasonable to expect that allowance price changes do not
exceed Hotelling’s rule, rising at the market rate of interest2. If inter-period
banking is restricted, lower Phase I prices and higher Phase II prices are ex-
1The notion of success may be approximated by various effects (pre-existing regulatory
environment, technology innovation and diffusion, reduction of regulatory uncertainty,
aggregate cost savings, etc) but we will focus on the efficiency of the permits price, i.e. its
ability to reflect current information on spot and future prices.
2If participants have complete information and emission targets are known. Hotelling
(1931) shows that in an efficient exploitation of an exhaustible resource, the percentage
change in net-price per unit of time should be equal to the discount rate in order to
maximize the present value of the resource capital over the extraction period. Otherwise,
arbitrage between periods is possible and the allowance price path will lead to non socially
desirable outcomes such as a concentration of emissions on early periods (Kling & Rubin
(1997)). Note that if borrowing is allowed, then the allowance price follows the Hotelling
rule for exhaustible resources; if borrowing is forbidden, then the allowance price rises at
a rate inferior to the interest rate.
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pected. The former result is due to the validity of allowances which is shorter
than the time horizon required by investors. The latter is due to increased
allowance scarcity compared to full inter-period banking.
The European Union Allowances (EUA) price path for the first and sec-
ond periods seem to match the case of the ban on banking. Beginning at
8=C on January 1st 2005, EUA prices increased to around 30=C in July 2005,
fluctuated during the six following months in the range from 20=C to 25=C,
then to 30=C until the end of April. On May 15th 2006, the release of 2005
verified emissions data had a depressive effect on EUA prices as shown by
the sharp break in the price of all maturities of EUAs in Figure 1. Those
data and subsequent updates revealed that verified emissions were about 80
million tons or 4% lower than the amount of allowances distributed to in-
stallations for 2005 emissions (Buchner & Ellerman (2007)). As most of the
price adjustment occurred within four days, the EU ETS is now sending two
price signals responding to different dynamics. First period prices are de-
clining towards zero, whereas second period prices are increasing to levels
up to 20=C primarily due to institutional factors disclosed by the European
Commission which has reaffirmed its will to enforce tighter targets in Phase
II.
Among the main explanations of low allowance prices towards the end of
Phase I, previous literature identifies over-allocation concerns, early abate-
ment efforts in 2005 due to high allowance prices, and possibly decreasing
abatement costs in 2006 due to abnormal temperatures and switching from
coal- to gas-fired electricity in a context of falling natural gas prices compared
to coal. Therefore, a thorough analysis of banking and borrowing provisions
appears necessary to disentangle those effects on allowance price changes.
Within the first period 2005-2007, participants are expected to use un-
restricted banking and borrowing. Based on this assumption, we test in an
empirical approach whether the EUA spot price pattern is consistent with a
competitive equilibrium in the intertemporal market where banking and bor-
rowing provisions are allowed. Schennach (2000)’s theoretical model of the
intertemporal permits market applied by Helfand et al. (2006) to the SO2
market guides our empirical analysis. We conduct a test of the Hotelling
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rule to validate whether EUA prices follow the interest rate over time. Be-
sides, we use the Ellerman & Parsons (2006) ratio (EPR)3 to (i) approximate
the scarcity of EUAs as perceived by market participants by the end of the
first period, and (ii) test whether the EUA spot price pattern reacts to the
scarcity of this environmental policy.
Including readily observable characteristics of the EU ETS such as the
presence of one endogenous structural break and the correlation with other
energy markets (brent and natural gas), our results show a significant re-
lationship between the EPR and EUA price changes. We also reject the
Hotelling rule and argue that the inter-period ban on banking undermines
the ability of the EU ETS to provide efficient price signalling. Finally, we
find evidence of institutional learning among market participants.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the theoretical framework from which we derive our estimation strategy. Sec-
tion 3 explicits our econometric specification to test the Hotelling rule. Sec-
tion 4 summarizes the data used. Section 5 provides a discussion of the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic Modeling
The model estimated is based on two articles by Schennach (2000) and Slade
& Thille (1997). It was first applied on the US SO2 market by Helfand et al.
(2006).
2.1 Schennach (2000)
First, Schennach (2000) studies the banking behavior of regulated industrials
in the Acid Rain Program and implicitly the behavior of spot prices in a
stochastic, continous-time, infinite horizon model for allowance allocation,
use and storage. Under certainty, the model predicts that the CO2 price path
would increase smoothly at the rate of interest according to the Hotelling
3Briefly defined as the December 2007 maturity allowance price over the december 2008
maturity allowance price plus a 40=C penalty for non compliance.
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rule. Under uncertainty, the optimization program of risk-neutral agents is
modelled as follows:
minet
{
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−µtct(t − et)dt
]}
S˙t = Yt − et
St ≥ 0
with E(t) a Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, et the emis-
sions level after abatement, t the counterfactual emissions level, at = t− et
the total amount of abatement by all firms at time t, ct(at) the minimum
total cost incurred by all firms to abate at, Yt the total amount of allowances
distributed to agents, St the number of allowances in the bank at time t, r the
risk free interest rate, ρ the risk premium specific to holding allowances as an
asset in a diversified portfolio of investments, and µ = r+ ρ the rate specific
to risky assets in the spirit of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
The solution to this problem is a continuous time version of Pindyck
(1993)’s model of rational commodity pricing:
Et[Pt+1] = (1 + µ)Pt − ψt (1)
with ψt a convenience yield4. Eq. (1) therefore represents the basic relation-
ship we want to test.
2.2 Slade & Thille (1997)
Second, assuming an allowance may be considered as an exhaustible re-
source5, Slade & Thille (1997)’s model provides an analogous theoretical
4According to Ellerman et al. (2000), an agents may benefit from holding a stock of
allowances on hand to buffer itself against unexpected changes in emissions, which is called
a convenience yield.
5According to Liski & Montero (2006), the following differences may be highlighted.
First, in a permits market with banking, the market may remain after the exhaustion
of the bank; while the market of a non-renewable resource vanishes after the last unit
extraction. Second, permits extraction and storage costs are equal to zero; while those
costs are generally positive for a non-renewable resource. Third, the demand for an extra
permit usually comes from a derived demand of other firms that also hold permits; while
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framework by maximizing the function V (R, p, φ):
maxqτ Et
{∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)piτdτ
}
R˙τ = −qτ
Rτ ≥ 0, qτ ≥ 0
∂φ
φ
= µφdt+ σφdzφ
∂p
p
= µptdt+ ρpdzp
with piτ = [pτqτ − C(qτ , Rτ , φτ )] the risk-adjusted profit at the discount rate
ρ, φ a random productivity shock, R˙ the state of the bank R as a function of
the extraction rate q. The last two constraints represent a set of Ito processes
with drift to model uncertainty.
At the equilibrium, the evolution of the allowance price Pt is:
1
∂t
Et∂Pt
Pt
= r + β(rm − r) ≡ ρ (2)
with Et expected utility, r the risk-free interest rate, rm the investment rate
of return in a diversified portfolio, and β the risk premium specific to the
asset. ρ represents to risk-adjusted discount rate used by firms to choose the
emissions path that minimizes abatement costs.
Against this economic modeling background, we detail in the next section
our econometric specification.
3 Econometric specification
To develop an estimable form of equation, we use the CAPM empirical spec-
ification developed by Helfand et al. (2006) to yield an expression for the
expectation at t of the allowance price at t+ 1.
As developed in Helfand et al. (2006), we rearrange eq.(1) to isolate first-
the demand for an extra unit of a non-renewable resource comes more often from a derived
demand of another actor (e.g., a consumer).
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difference prices on the left-hand side:
Et pt+1 − pt = rft pt + ρtpt − ψt (3)
Rewriting ρt =
σam
σmm
(rmt − rft ), which is standard practice for CAPM,
yields:
Et pt+1 − pt = rft pt +
σam
σmm
(rmt − rft ) pt − ψt (4)
where rft is the risk-free rate, rmt is the rate of return on the market portfolio,
σam is the covariance between the rate of return of EUA prices and rmt , and
σmm is the variance of rmt . The first term r
f
t ptrepresents the Hotelling rule for
cost-minimizing intertemporal arbitrage in the EU ETS market. The second
term σam
σmm
is the risk premium for holding allowances as part of a diversified
portfolio. The expression (rmt −rft ) is the excess return on the market portfolio
at time t.
Since the expected value of pt+1 is known only with errors at time t, we
substitute Et pt+1 by pt+1 + t+1:
pt+1 − pt = rft pt +
σam
σmm
(rmt − rft ) pt − ψt + t+1 (5)
with  the error term. Note we take we take first log-differenced EUA price
series. Finally, assuming the convenience yield is constant (ψt = ψ), we get:
pt+1 − pt = α + β1rft pt + β2(rmt − rft ) pt + t+1 (6)
where α = −ψ and β2 = σamσmm . Eq. (6) represents the "base model" where
β1 = 1 tests the Hotelling rule and β2 provides information on the CAPM
risk premium for CO2 allowances which is the difference between the expected
return on allowances and the return of the risk-free asset.
3.1 Structural break
The dataset is divided into two sub-periods due to the presence of one struc-
tural break as displayed in Figure 1. Using the method developed by Lee &
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Strazicich (2001)6 that endogenously looks for structural breaks while testing
for the existence of a unit root, we identify April, 20th 2006 as a breakpoint
in our dataset.
For this reason, two sub-samples are considered: the sub-sample #1 goes
from 01/07/2005 to 20/04/2006, and sub-sample #2 goes from 21/04/2006
to 31/05/2007. This endogenous structural break may be associated to in-
stitutional features of the EU ETS during Phase I. As 54% of the EUA spot
prices adjustment was made within four days7 starting on April 24, 2006,
this break eliminates prior speculative information and revealed agents’ net
short/long positions. The break point may be seen as an indicator of the
number of allowances either banked or borrowed at the end of the first 2005
compliance.
3.2 Base model with the environmental policy constraint
The European Commission defined the environmental constraint by vali-
dating each NAP before the launch of the emissions trading program. In
2006-2007, MS are currently operating under their NAP II for the period
2008-2012.
Without banking and borrowing provisions between the two trading pe-
riods, Ellerman & Parsons (2006) stated "it is virtually certain that the EU
ETS will then be either long or short; the likelihood of a perfect match between
1st period EUAs and emissions are extremely small. This binary outcome
places a limit on 1st period prices that, when coupled with the constraint on
inter-period banking, allows a probability of shortage to be calculated taking
into account all the uncertainties weather, economic growth, energy prices,
and the abatement response to carbon prices."
From this perspective, Ellerman and Parson define the probability of
scarcity expected by market’s participants at any point in time as the ratio
between the 1st period future 2007 price and the 2nd period future price 2008,
6An advantage of this method is that the data themselves suggest the possible timing
of structural breaks. We provide the estimated break point for the EUA prices in first
difference based on model 1, with a lag of four days and 436 observations.
7See Buchner & Ellerman (2007).
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plus 40=C, which represent the penalty8:
Pr(scarcity) =
EUA2007
40=C+ EUA2008
Therefore, the higher the perceived scarcity of allowances, the higher the
CO2 prices. As shown in Figure 2, the expected allowance scarcity is largely
reflected in spot price changes. Introducing in the "Base model" the epr
variable as a proxy of the environmental policy constraint during Phase I,
eq.(6) becomes:
pt+1 − pt = α + β1rft pt + β2(rmt − rft ) pt + β3epr + t+1 (7)
3.3 Base model with the environmental policy constraint
and energy market shocks
As a final step to explain 2005-2007 allowance price changes, the model is esti-
mated with the environmental policy constraint and shocks from other energy
markets related to the EU ETS. The purpose is to disentangle EUA price
changes from the fluctuations of energy markets. According to Mansanet-
Bataller et al. (2007), EUA prices are influenced by energy markets and
weather.
Following Helfand et al. (2006), we use forecast errors9 lagged one period
for energy variables and a temperatures index as explanatory variables in
eq.(7):
pt+1−pt = α+β1rft pt+β2(rmt −rft ) pt+β3epr+β4brent+β5ngas+β6temp+t+1
(8)
with brent the brent price series, ngas the natural gas price series and temp
an European temperatures index defined below.
We detail in the next section the data used.
8The penalty will be 100=C thereafter and companies will also have to surrender a
compensating amount of allowances.
9We compute forecast errors by using the method of one-step ahead forecast.
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4 Data
Descriptive statistics may be found in Table 1 (see the Appendix).
4.1 CO2 price
The price of European emissions allowances is determined in several markets:
the Over-the-Counter (OTC), on spot and on futures markets.The most liq-
uid market is the OTC market. Dealing on the OTC market transactions are
usually through indutrials or brokers, consequently price data is confidential,
or available through commercial energy consultancies. The London Energy
Brokers Association (LEBA) produces each trading day an index price us-
ing the volume weighted average of EUA trades since December 2006. The
most liquid futures market is the European Climate Exchange and the most
liquid spot market is Powernext Carbon launched in June 2005. We use the
daily EUA spot price (pt in =C/tonne of CO2) negotiated from 01/07/05 to
31/05/07 on Powernext carbon.
4.2 Interest rates
The risk-free rate of return (rft ) is the 3-months Euribor presented as annual
percentages with daily data frequency. To convert each daily observation to
a daily interest rate, we used the following formula: r = (1 + i
4
)4 − 1 with
r the annual interest rate with a daily data frequency and i the quarterly
interest rate with a daily data frequency. Thus, rft is expressed in percentage
points at daily rates. (See Figure 2).
The rate of return on the market portfolio of risky assets (rmt ) is the Dow
Jones EuroStoXX 50 Index annual return with a daily data frequency. To
convert each daily observation to a daily interest rate, we used the following
formula: r = (1+ i
250
)250−1 with r the annual interest rate with a daily data
frequency and i the daily interest rate. Thus, rmt is expressed in percentage
points at daily rates. (See Figure 2)
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4.3 Energy prices
On energy markets, we use the brent price (brent in $/baril) is the daily brent
crude Futures price negociated from 01/07/05 to 31/05/207 on the Intercon-
tinental Exchange (ICE), the Europe’s leading energy exchange, futures. The
euro-dollar exchange rate provided by the European Central Bank is used to
ensure all variables are transformed to the same currency. The natural gas
(ngas in =C /Mwh) is the daily natural gas price negociated from 01/07/05
to 31/05/207 on Zeebrugge Hub.
4.4 Weather
Concerning climate conditions, we use a temperatures index (temp in ◦C)
as the daily data of European temperatures index published by Tendances
Carbone10. It is equal to the average of national temperatures indices pro-
vided by Powernext weighted by the share of each NAP in the total of four
countries. These national indices are the mean temperatures for the four
countries: Spain, France, Germany and United Kingdom, calculated as the
average of the temperatures at the representative regional weather station
weighted by the regional population.
4.5 Stationarity tests
Because econometric results may be unreliable if the dependent variable is
non-stationary, we first need to test the stationarity of allowance prices and
their first-difference. One possible complication of unit root tests for station-
arity is that the presence of structural changes during the time series may
make rejection of a unit root more difficult (Perron (1989)). We performed
usual unit root tests (ADF, PP, KPSS) for all price series and found that all
of them are characterized by a unit root. When tests are applied on series in
first differences, they are found to be stationary. In other words, all prices
series are integrated of order 1 (I(1))11.
10Tendances Carbone is the monthly bulletin of the European Carbon Market published
by the Caisse des Depots and Powernext Carbon.
11Detailed results of the unit root tests are available upon request to the authors.
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5 Results
Results of equations (5), (6) and (7) for each period are presented in Table 2
(see Appendix). The ”Base model” is refered to as Model 1, the ”Base model
with the environmental policy constraint” as Model 2 and the ”Base model
with the environmental policy constraint and energy market shocks” as Model
3. Estimations are computed using OLS and the Newey-West procedure to
correct for serial correlation and generate robust standard errors (NW-OLS).
The explained variable is the first log-differenced EUA price series12.
Based on the correlogram of the first log-differenced EUA price series,
the true data generating process is characterized as an ARMA(p,q) of order
1. This is confirmed by autoregressive and moving average coefficients being
statistically different from 0 in Table 2. For each regression, the Lagrange-
Multiplier test indicates residuals are not autocorrelated. When the White
test shows evidence of heteroskedasticity, a GARCH(p,q) model of order 1
is implemented as robustness checks in Table 3 using Bollerslev Wooldrige
robust standard errors and covariance. Since both estimation techniques
yield to similar results13, we comment only NW-OLS coefficients to simplify
the exposition.
5.1 Failure of the Hotelling rule for the EU ETS 2005-
2007 intertemporal market
For the validation of the Hotelling rule, the null hypothesis is that β1 = 1 in
eq.(8). The confidence interval where the true value of the β parameter has
a 95% probability to be is calculated according to the formula:
CI = [βˆ ± 2.11 ∗ Std.error]
The Hotelling rule is rejected in all models: in full period the confidence
interval is [0.0295; 0.0495] for Model 1 (Table 2, row 1), [0.0182; 0.0614] for
12Thus, we are interested in the growth rate of the explained variable.
13GARCH coefficients are stable with significant estimates in the mean and variance
equations.
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Model 2 (row 2) and [0.0158; 0.0736] for Model 3 (row 3). Confidence intervals
have also been computed for the two sub-periods, and yield to a similar
conclusion.14. Hence, the EUA price path does not appear consistent with a
competitive equilibrium in the 2005-2007 intertemporal market.
Yet the non-validation of the Hotelling rule for the first two years of the
EU ETS is not worrying in itself. At best, it has to be seen as an indicator
of scarcity under certainty, while our test was conducted under uncertainty.
Helfand et al. (2006) tested the Hoteling rule for the time path of SO2 permit
prices and reached the similar conclusion that the SO2 price path was not
consistent with a competitive equilibrium in the intertemporal market. This
question of competitive equilibrium relates directly to the issue of the market
efficiency. As noted by Helfand et al. (2006), ”Under the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics, evidence of competitive equilibrium would im-
ply dynamic efficiency. In this case, dynamic efficiency involves minimizing
present-value cost of compliance with the intertemporal emissions regulation”.
Kronenberg (2006) provides other reasons to justify this failure, for instance
by paying attention to the fact that permits are characterized by a costless
extraction or by focusing on strategic interactions between firms.
As noted previously, the efficiency of allowance trading is linked to the
authorization of full banking and restricted borrowing (Schennach (2000),
Kling & Rubin (1997)). With such provisions, market prices reflect oppor-
tunity costs leading to an efficient choice of abatement measures (Schleich
et al. (2006)). The rejection of the competitive equilibrium assumption in the
intertemporal market implies EUA price changes do not adequately reflect
abatement costs at the installation level during 2005-2007. In terms of bank-
ing behaviour, after the 2005-2006 over-supplied compliance periods, most
industrials have necessarily banked unused allowances before selling them on
the market, whereas a minority of them may need to borrow allowances.
Another piece of information glanced from Table 2 concerns the lack of sig-
nificancy of the β2 coefficient, which means during 2005-2007 CO2 allowances
do not appear to bear a risk-premium as part of a diversified commodities
portfolio.
14A journal of those results is available upon request to the authors.
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5.2 Evidence of institutional learning within the EU
ETS
As depicted in Figure 2, the perceived scarcity of allowances was increasing
at the launch of the EU ETS despite early concerns of over-allocation. Our
results tend to confirm this view by showing a positive influence of the envi-
ronmental policy constraint on allowance price changes. During 2005-2007,
we find a significant relationship between the EPR ratio and EUA price
changes in Model 2 (Table 2, row 2) and Model 3 (row 3) both at 1%. While
diagnostic tests indicate Model 3 performs slightly better than Model 2, it is
worth underlining the stable coefficient and sign of the epr variable accross
models. Allowance price changes are largely determined by the environmen-
tal policy constraint and react to the EPR ratio with the expected sign, i.e.
the higher (lower) the perceived allowance scarcity the higher (lower) the
allowance price.
In sub-periods, the EPR ratio is not significant before the compliance
break (Table 2, rows 5 and 6), and becomes significant after the break at
5% (Model 3, row 9). Before the price adjustment, allowance trading may
be characterized as hazardous or speculative, and only the release of first
compliance verified emissions gave a hint about the net short/long positions
at the installation level. After the break, market participants form their
anticipations more accurately in a context of a low environmental policy
constraint coupled to a ban on inter-period banking which explains why the
EPR ratio becomes significant.
Therefore, a second main finding of our tests lies in the evidence of insti-
tutional learning within the first two years of the EU ETS. The April, 2006
structural break suggests EUA price changes are affected by institutional
events such as the simultaneous releases of 2005 verified emissions by the
Walloon Region of Belgium, France and Spain which serve as a proxy for
the adjustment of agents’ expectations. Most of the verified emissions were
reported by mid-May. The fact that the EUA price responded quickly to
such relevant information may be interpreted as a strong sign of efficiency of
the EU ETS.
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5.3 Influence of energy markets
Besides the structural break due to the first institutional compliance, another
sign of the efficiency of the EU ETS is that the EUA price pattern responds
to information related with energy markets. On the full period, EUA price
changes respond positively to brent prices at 5% in Model 3 (Table 2, row 3)15
and to natural gas prices at 1%. This relationship holds true in sub-periods:
before the compliance break, brent and natural gas prices are positive and
significant at 1% (row 6); while after the break, only the brent variable is
positive and significant at 1% (row 9). These results are consistent with
Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) who identified brent and natural gas prices
as key energy determinants of EUA price changes.
Our point is to show the influence of the environmental policy constraint
is robust to the introduction of market shocks: coefficient estimates for the
EPR ratio remain significant at 1% in full period (row 3), non-significant
before the break (row 6) and significant at 5% after the break (row 9).
5.4 Robustness checks
Note that adding incrementally explanatory variables to the ”Base model”
also serves as robustness checks for coefficient estimates. Since financial mar-
ket places are strongly correlated, the inclusion of the Euronext 100 Index
instead of the DJ Euro StoXX 50 as the rate of return of a diversified port-
folio does not change the results and the Hotelling rule is still rejected in all
models. As an additional robustness check, we conduct a Chow breakpoint
test for the determination of the structural break and reject the null hypoth-
esis that the sample does not contain a structural break at a 5% confidence
level16.
15While the negative sign of the brent variable lagged five days is due to price adjust-
ments, we verify in the following regressions that brent prices indeed impact positively
EUA price changes.
16A journal of those results may be obtained upon request to the authors
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6 Conclusion
This article may be seen as an attempt to characterize the efficiency of the
intertemporal market during Phase I of the EU ETS. Due to the ban on
inter-period banking between 2007 and 2008, we have highlighted a total dis-
connection between prices of first and second period allowances with a clear
decline of the first period prices. Within the first 2005-2007 period, market
participants are expected to use free banking and borrowing of allowances.
In this context, we test whether the EUA spot prices follow the Hotelling
rule as the key element of a competitive equilibrium and find evidence for
the rejection of the rule.
A second main finding of our test lies in the evidence of an institution-
nal learning within the two first years of the EU ETS. We show statistical
evidence of an endogenous structural break stated in 20 April,2006, which
serves as a proxy for the adjustment of agents’ expectations and reveals EUA
price changes are affected by institutional events. Our results also stress a
significant relationship between EUA price changes and the environmental
constraint proxied by the perceived allowance scarcity. Before the first com-
pliance in April 2006, EUA prices path were influenced by the environmental
constraint with a lag of five days whereas after the endogenous structural
break EUA prices responded to it without lags. Market participants were
basically learning how to use tradable permits. These results tend to coun-
terbalance the previous analysis and provides some signs of efficiency of the
EU ETS during Phase I.
We also find evidence that EUA prices are influenced by other market
shocks. We incorporated energy and temperatures variables to isolate ef-
fects of the current economic situation on EUA prices, and validated brent
prices, natural gas prices and the European temperatures index as influenc-
ing EUA price variations. The specific effects of energy markets and climatic
conditions on the European carbon market needs to be further assessed.
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7 Appendix
Figure 1: EUA Prices and Volume Exchanged from 01/07/05 to 31/05/07
Source: Powernext carbon
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Figure 2: The probability of EUA allowances shortage at the end of the 1st
period Source: Ellerman & Parsons (2006)
Figure 3: Rates of return for 3 Months-Euribor and Dow Jones Euro StoXX
50 in percentage points at daily rates Source: Banque de France and Eu-
ronext
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Notes on Tables:
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the energy price series under consid-
eration. Table 2 presents the results of equations (5), (6) and (7) regressing
by NW-OLS. The dependent variable is the first log-differenced EUA price
series. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1% level, ∗∗ at 5% level and ∗ at 10% level.
In Table 3, GARCH estimation are computed for the ”full period” and the
”after the compliance break period” when the White test indicated the pres-
ence of heteroskedasticity. The following diagnostic tests for the quality of
the regressions are reported in each table: the simple R-squared, the adjusted
R-squared, the p-value of the F-test statistic (F −Stat), the Durbin-Watson
statistic (D.W.), the p-value of the the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation
Lagrange Multiplier test (LM), the p-value of the White heteroskedasticity
test (White test), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz
Criterion (SC).
Mean Median Max. Min. Std.
Dev.
Skew. Kurt. Obs.
Full period
pt 15.221 16.090 29.750 0.250 9.070 -0.353 1.834 492
brent 0.002 0.016 57.919 -58.168 5.287 0.031 116.522 492
ngas -0.016 -0.155 11.566 -10.550 1.654 0.976 14.868 492
Before the compliance break
pt 23.819 22.950 29.750 18.850 2.564 0.435 2.104 206
brent 0.002 0.014 57.919 -58.168 5.804 -0.074 98.057 206
ngas -0.005 -0.304 11.566 -10.550 1.947 1.024 14.056 206
After the compliance break
pt 9.029 9.520 29.430 0.250 6.715 0.118 2.017 286
brent -0.013 0.033 57.776 -57.283 4.891 0.154 134.780 286
ngas 0.001 -0.015 7.206 -6.844 1.410 0.783 11.927 286
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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